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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an action to recover money misa~propriated 
from plaintiff-respondent. T~e counterclaim asks for an 
accounting. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOT-.TER COURT 
On October 20, 1967, plaintiff filed suit against ~on 
McLean who entered a counterclaim. 
On October 15, 1981, the Court entered an Or1er dismis-
sing this case with prejudice for lack of Drosecution. 
-1 -
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondents submit the Order of the District Court 
dismissing the case with prejudice should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1967, Kearns Liquidation Center, Inc., filed suit 
against Ron McLean for payment on goods received by defen-
dant. Defendant submitted an Answer, and Third-Party Complaint 
against plaintiff and John Paras in November, 1967. 
Plaintiff and counter-defendant submitted 'L1otice of 
Readiness for Trial on December 11, 1967. 
Trial settings were made for December 1 .., -~- ' 196g, February 
13, 1969, and March 19, 1069, but no triA-1 was ever held. 
A new trial date was set in 1976, but litigation was avoided 
on a stipulation ~repared by defendant. The Stipulation 
provided tllat following defendant's accountin~ of plaintif+:'s 
business records, "the above-entitled matter ma~r 't>e dismis-
sed or the results of the examination used as a basis for 
judgment pursuant to further consideration bv the Court." 
(CR 53). Plaintiff entrusted its cornorate books and records 
to defendant's attorney, Dwight L. King, Esq., for inspection 
and auditing. From that point, both sides dro~ped the matter 
as unworthy of any further action. Defendant produced no 
formal accounting as a basis for judgment. The :>laintiff 
and counter-defendant have no knowledP;e of the nresent location 
- '? -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the original corporate records. Defendant's third at-
torney received no records upon his predecessor's withdrawal. 
Finally, in March of 1980, defendant again obtained 
new counsel. M.C. Morley, plaintiff Corporation's bookkeener 
and an essential witness, had by this time passed away but 
Mr. John Paras did his best to respond during defendant's 
deposition on July 18, 1980. In spite of very diligent search-
ing, plaintiff's Corporate records could not be found and 
this dearth of essential information is reflected in May 
5, 1981 answers to defendant's interro~atories. (CR 62-55). 
As it became clear that it was i~uossible for the resoondents 
. '· 
to effectively prepare for trial, motion to dismiss for lack 
of prosecution was made. Upon argument before the Court on 
October 5, 1981, dismissal with prejudice was granted for 
lack of prosecution. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
THE APPELLANTS HAVE NO BASIS FOR A CLAI~1 01? E~ROR ON 
APPEAL BECAUSE DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE T.JAS P~OPER 
UNDER UTAH CASE LAW AND RULE 4l(b) OF UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
Rule L~l (b) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires 
that "for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute ... a defen-
dant may move ~or dismissal 0£ an action or of any claim 
against him." The plaintiff, or in this case the counter-
plaintiff, has the responsibility to ciiligentl:r prosecute 
-3-
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his claim. Serious delays in the prosecution of a claim 
can result in unfair prejudice to one side. The reason for 
the rule is that memories dim, evidence deteriorates and 
is lost over ten years and occasionally a key witness dies. 
The State of Utah has a strong line of recent authority 
supporting dismissal in cases where litigation has remained 
dormant for an extended period of time. The key case under 
this line of authority is Westinghouse Electric Supply Compa 
vs. Paul W. Larson Contractors, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 
1975). The Court examined the issue of whether granting 
the Motion to Dismiss with prejudice was an abuse of discre-
tion. The Court indicates that t~e trial Court should have 
reasonable latitude of discretion in dismissing for failure 
to prosecute if a party fails to move forward according to 
the rules and directions of the Court without justifiable 
excuse. The Court outlines four factors for determinin~ 
whether there is a justifiable excuse for delay: length of 
time, conduct of both parties, difficulty or prejudice to 
the moving party, whether injustice may result from dismissa 
In this case the suit has been pending for fourteen 
years and has remained dormant with no action at all for 
five years. This is not a case of unusually complicated 
discovery as in ~Jestinghouse. In fact appellant offers no 
excuse for his inaction before and after 1976. Respondents 
-4-
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sought and were prepared for trial on many occasions. In 
particular respondents were prepared for trial several times 
in 1968 and also in 1976. But appellant avoided trial in 
1976 by obtaining the .stipulation found in the Record at 
53. Pursuant to that stipulation, ap~ellant took control 
of the corporate records but then lapsed into inaction again. 
He did not fashion a settlement on the basis of plaintiff's 
records or make any accounting as agreed. Both sides again 
dropped the matter as unworthy of further time and effort. 
The third factor considered in Hestinghouse is prejudice 
from delay upon one side. In this case, the difficulties 
resulting from delayed prosecution are very evident. The 
corporate records cannot be found. It would appear that 
these records were last in the hands of respondent's attorney. 
A key witness who might have provided evidence from memory 
• l b £ d h d mh d • .C-f • 1 • in t 1e a sence o recor s as passe away . .!.1 ese . l.L ._icu ties 
have made counter-defendant's trial preparation nearly impos-
sible. In considering the fourth factor, the counter-ulaintiff 
had all the corporate records in his hands in 1076 but didn't 
pursue his desired remedy. Now there are no records for 
an accounting and appellant's failure to act obviates any 
injustice from a dismissal. 
While appellant offers no excuses for his delays over 
fourteen years he seeks relief from a default judgment which 
-5-
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would result in substantial prejudice and injustice to the 
adverse party. Appellant suggests that his diligence in 
preparing for trial in 1981 should cure his failures over 
the years prior to that time. Respondents sought dismissal 
only after a diligent, good faith effort to marshal infer-
mation for trial. Must a defendant move for dismissal im-
mediately in a case of unreasonable delay? 
Rule. 41 (b) sets no deadline for the moving party 
to act; indeed, the Court retains inherent power 
to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute pur-
suant to its own motion. It can hardly be asserted 
that a defendant must, on pain of iriplied T.·1aiver, 
move within a certain time limit, when the Court 
may issue a dismissal order without any action what-
soever on the part of the parties .. 
~'1i ls on v. Lambert, 613 P. 2d 765, 768 
(Utah 1980). 
Wilson vs. Lambert is a case where dism.issal for failure 
to prosecute was upheld on appeal. The coraplaint was filed 
in March, 1968, and the matter was set for trial in 1973, 
but the plaintiff's attorney was unable to handle the trialg 
Plaintiff vacated another trial date in 1977. More than nine 
years after the original complaint was filed, the Court is-
sued, sua sponte, an order to the parties to ap~ear and show 
cause why the action would not be dismis.sed because of fail-
ure to prosecute. Upon a hearing, the Court referred t~e 
matter to the trial calendar. Plaintiff began discovery 
procedures, but nine months later defendant filed a motion 
to dismiss for failure to diligently prosecute, which motion 
-6-
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was granted. 
"There can be little argument regarding the pro-
priety of the dismissal here appealed from. Plain-
tiff's predecessor in interest personally delayed 
the consideration of the denied applications by 
the lower Court from 1968 until the time of his 
death in 19750 Thereafter, plaintiffs, even fol-
lowing the approval of their purchase from Baldwin's 
estate by the probate Court, delayed sixteen months 
before even inaugurating discovery in the matter. 
No explanation justifying such delay is offered 
in the arguments or in the record". 
613 P.2d 765, 768. 
Just as in Wilson v. Lambert, this case was set for trial 
and co1mter-plaintiff engaged in discovery orocedures. 
Brasher Motor and Finance Company vs. Brovm, 23 U.2d 
247, 461 P.2d 464 (1969), is a failure of prosecution case 
wherein dismissal was upheld. In Brasher Motor, suit was 
filed and defendants filed a counterclaim. Justice Henriod 
writes that "everyone treated the litigation with a silent 
reverence accorded that which is interred---until, lo and 
behold, five and one-half years later the Browns, like Abou 
Ben Adhem, awoke from a deep dream of peace, and attempted. 
to exhume and reactivate what for all intents and pur~oses 
appeared to have been a litigious corpse." The Court on 
its own motion dismissed the complaint and counterclaim. 
After a delay of five and one-half years with absolutely 
no action on either side, the Court indicated that "~Je be-
lieve and hold that in the instant case the trial Court did 
not abuse its discretion, but on the contrary acted with 
judicial propriety looking to the interests of all litigants 
-7-
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and in promoting their causes with reasonable dispatch 
- ' 
certainly in preventing indiscriminate jostling and clogging 
of Court calendarso" 461 P.2d 464,465. 
The case of Johnson v. Firebrand, 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 
1977) does not apply to this case. In John~, the movin~ 
party had not even filed an answer until making the motion 
to dismiss and the Court made much of this fact. "(I)n view 
of the fact that new counsel caused the case to be activated, 
it seeras that the Court abused its discretion in dismissing 
the case on a motion to dismiss that was filed at the same 
time as the answer" (571Po2d1368, 1370). Utah Oil Co. 
v. Harris, 565 P2d 1135 (Utah 1977) is also distinguishable. 
The delay of 16 months was reasonably excusable in light 
of settlement efforts between the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
The dismissal for lack of orosecution in this case was 
well within the reasonable discretion of the Court because 
the policy considerations of Rule 4l(b) were well served. 
The respondent has been substantially prejudiced by the four-
teen year delay. Appellant's recent diligence can not cure 
that prejudice and Rule 4l(b) sets no deadline for the movin~ 
party to act. It is respectfully submitted that this Court 
should affirm the order of the District Court. 
-8-
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Respectfully submitted this IZ-----d.ay of March, 1982. 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Counter-
Defendants-Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The foregoing Respondent's Brief was served on Defendant 
Appellant by mailing two copies thereof, first class mail, 
postage prepaid, to Robert R. Mallinckrodt,Esq., Mallinckrodt 
& Mallinckrodt, 10 Exchange Place, Suite 1010, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, their attorney, this /7 day of Harch, 
1982. 
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